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Immanuel Kant concludes his famous essay on enlightenment as an ongoing 
project of reason by referring to nature’s careful unwrapping of “the seed” 
that is humans’ “propensity and calling to think freely”. Gradually, humans 
become able to act freely. Eventually, their propensity to think freely works 
“even upon the principles of government” (Kant 1996a, 22; Kant’s empha-
ses). Enlightenment therefore becomes, also, a political project. This essay 
was immediately followed by another, in which Kant elaborated on its con-
clusion: “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”, which 
speculated upon historical purposiveness. Later, in his third and final Cri-
tique, he elaborated an account of reflective judgement upon apparent pur-
posiveness in nature.
Against what (to anticipate) we might fairly call Kant’s teleology of rea-
son and freedom it has been contended that “enlightenment thinking” and 
“the institutions of society with which it is intertwined, already contains the 
germ of ... regression” so that beneath “the sun of calculating reason ... the 
seeds of the new barbarism are germinating” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, 
xvi). A “horror of relapsing into barbarism” was identified as “the root of 
Kantian optimism”, growing “from Kant’s Critique to Nietzsche’s Genealogy 
of Morals” into Nietzsche’s renewal of “Kant’s endeavor to transform the 
divine law into an autonomous principle” of universalizing, legislative will, 
“the secret of [Nietzsche’s] Overman” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, 66–67, 
90). So argued Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, having fled German 
Nazism.
Alasdair MacIntyre’s now still more famous critique of Enlightenment 
thinking about morality is less pessimistic. It shares the crucial concern 
with what Adorno and Horkheimer called the “intertwinement” of reason 
and institutionalization whilst rejecting their idea that this intertwinement 
has the necessity of a “dialectic”. “What we are oppressed by is not power, 
but impotence”, he counters (MacIntyre 2007, 75.). Having argued in Af-
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ter Virtue’s first half that “the Enlightenment project of justifying morality” 
(MacIntyre 2007, 36ff., 51ff.) non–teleologically had failed for reasons first 
forcibly pressed by Nietzsche, he concludes both halves of that book by pos-
ing the question of “Nietzsche or Aristotle” (MacIntyre 2007, 109ff., 256ff). 
What he calls for is a return not to what our post–Kantian critical theorists 
called “myth” but to what he calls an Aristotelian way of reasoning about 
practice.
The conclusion to which this essay moves is that the choice we face now 
is less that between an updated Aristotle and Nietzsche than that of Mac-
Intyre’s contemporary Aristotelianism with a revitalized Kantianism. This 
is not because MacIntyre was mistaken in arguing that Enlightenment phi-
losophers failed to justify the rules of morality non–teleologically; rather, it 
is because, in the decades since publication of After Virtue, the failure of the 
Enlightenment’s project in moral philosophy has been compensated for by 
the renewed success of its political project of justifying coercion under law. 
This success has a source in the success of what was once called “the New 
Right”, and has now been extended through the global system of states that 
is justified in terms of “human rights” ().1 Kant is now widely acknowledged 
as the prescient theorist of this emergent system, in which rational maturity 
is identified with individuals’ responsibility for themselves as possessors of 
rights under the rule of law.
This conclusion will not be argued for directly in the essay’s first three 
sections, the concern of which is rather to trace the development of MacIn-
tyre’s critical understanding of Kant and Kantianism. Their point is to es-
tablish why he would resist the current philosophical fashion of trying to 
accommodate Aristotelian ethics and politics to those of Kant. The essay’s fi-
nal section therefore tries to go some way toward clarifying what is involved 
in posing the question of Kant or Aristotle, and what is involved in answer-
ing in terms of the contradiction of liberal ideals by capitalist exploitation 
and managerial manipulation. 
1 Before After Virtue
MacIntyre came to philosophy at a bad time for Kantianism. Of course, 
Kantianism had had a bad time in the previous century, when it had been 
eclipsed by rival idealisms and by various materialist scientisms. It had then 
revived in Germany, as neo–Kantianism, and had gained a new force with 
British idealism, in which it had been allied with both Hegel and Aristotle 
1 For an account of this project, see Charvet & Kaczynska–Nay, 2008, and for its history, see 
especially Moyn, 2010. 
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against native empiricism. By the late 1940s, though, that alliance had been 
broken by two world wars, in which British, French and American philoso-
phers had participated by attacking Hegel’s supposed sin of commissioning 
the state and Kant’s supposed sin of omitting rights in prioritizing duty. By 
midcentury, French philosophers had rejected idealism and Anglo–Ameri-
can ones had posited a modest logic of empiricism and analysis.
MacIntyre has recently recounted that he was then “inoculated ... against 
Kantianism for the rest of my life” by the dose he received as a Masters stu-
dent at Manchester (MacIntyre 2010, 63). He had presumably already de-
veloped some resistance to Kant through the British Communist Party’s or-
thodox Marxism–Leninism, according to which Kant had been corrected by 
Hegel who had, in turn, been corrected by Marx. Perhaps still earlier bases 
for this resistance could be found in experience of Nazism and war, given 
that when, after Eichmann’s notorious appeal in Jerusalem to Kant, he goes 
on to write A Short History of Ethics he concludes the chapter on Kant by sug-
gesting that a consequence of Kantian deontology was Germans’ education 
“into easy conformism with authority” (MacIntyre 1967, 214).
Once inoculated, MacIntyre developed a critique of Kant that he has 
retained ever since. This critique owed much to Hegel and Marx but also 
to a Scottish scholarly tradition stretching from the idealist Edward Caird 
— in this, an argumentative ally of the Oxford idealist T. H. Green — to 
Norman Kemp Smith, which emphasized how Kant’s first Critique should 
be understood as a response to the empiricist scepticism of an earlier Scot, 
David Hume. “In this country we are accustomed to read Kant in the light of 
Hume”, wrote MacIntyre in 1953, even when commending another, “scho-
lastic approach to Kant” (MacIntyre 1953, 199, 201), some merits of which 
he could already see but the full rationale of which he could not yet accept.2
MacIntyre published his critique of Kant in 1959, in two important but 
very different papers. One of these papers was published in The Philosophi-
cal Review, and was the first of his publications to provoke great excitement 
amongst academic philosophers. In a previous paper he had criticized the 
idea that “when we judge morally it is at the heart of the matter that we 
‘do not make exceptions in our own favour’ (Kant), that the moral agent 
must ‘depart from his private and particular situation’ (Hume)” (MacIntyre 
1957, 331). Now, in “Hume on ’Is’ and ‘Ought’”, he instead sought to free 
Hume from guilt by epistemological association with Kant’s implausible 
dissociation of moral from factual propositions and, more specifically and 
significantly, from Kant’s dissociation of the rationality of moral judgement 
2 I was unaware of Thomism’s early influence upon MacIntyre when I wrote Knight 2007. 
I attempt to integrate it into a brief account of MacIntyre’s development in Knight 2013. 
MacIntyre summarizes an aspect of that influence in remarking on Vincent McNabb in 
MacIntyre 2015.
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and action from any empirical facts of need and interest or of inclination 
and desire. That Kant should be understood as a true philosophical pro-
genitor of logical positivists’ fact/value distinction MacIntyre had no doubt. 
It was, after all, a message that had been reinforced by two further, influ-
ential Scottish idealists: J.H. Muirhead, who was one of those responsible 
for bifurcating modern moral philosophy between consequentialism and a 
Kantian ethics of rules, and H.J. Paton, who, in a translation and influential 
commentaries in the late 1940s, had identified, for Kant’s still–remaining 
Anglophone audience, an almost exclusive identification of Kantian ethics 
with the idea of the categorical imperative enunciated in Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Against this idea of a “morality of law–and–noth-
ing–else”, which MacIntyre historicized as the outcome of the Protestant 
Reformation, he already opposed the “Thomist” synthesis of “an Aristotelian 
moral psychology and a Christian view of the moral law”. In contrast to 
what he was to later argue in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, he then pre-
sented Hume “as the last representative of [that] older tradition”; “the virtue 
of Hume’s ethics, like that of Aristotle and unlike that of Kant, is that it seeks 
to preserve morality as something psychologically intelligible” (MacIntyre 
1959, 467–8). His critique of any rigorist deontological ethics, such as that 
most famously and coherently expressed in the Groundwork, remains that it 
is practically impotent because it denies to morality any motivational force, 
since its impersonal rationality denies to any real person any reason suf-
ficient to move her to action. What is capable of moving people to action is 
what he calls “desire”.
This critique of Kantian ethics as psychologically unintelligible was re-
peated in that now even more famous 1959 essay, “Notes from the Moral 
Wilderness”. In its first half, MacIntyre’s target was the Kantesque “moral 
critic of Stalinism”; in the essay’s second half Kant himself made a brief ap-
pearance, to separate “the ‘ought’ of morality ... from the ‘is’ of desire” and, 
thereby, to ground and warrant “the liberal belief in the autonomy of moral-
ity”. This modern belief, which renders morality rationally “unintelligible as 
a form of human action”, MacIntyre already accused of being like belief in 
“primitive taboos”. As later in After Virtue, he argued that moral “rules still 
have point, but men have forgotten what their point is” (MacIntyre 1998a, 
41–2). By having “point”, he intends something that is both rationalizable 
and capable of motivating action. 
It might be thought that MacIntyre was attempting to escape from a 
Kantian antinomy by a characteristically German route; at once, Kantian, 
Hegelian, Marxist, and even (in at least one of the movement’s guises) neo–
Kantian. The antinomy is that of freedom and determinism (Kant 1998, 
485–9 (A444/B472–A451/B479)), morality and nature, reasons and causes, 
the moral ought and anthropological inclination, idealism and empiricism; 
disphi15.indd   172 10.02.2015   11:14:22
DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA  Kelvin Knight: “If my thesis is correct, Kant was right”
173
indeed, of values versus facts. These opposites he proposed to synthesize by 
reference to “human nature” (MacIntyre 1998a, 45), which is possible if mo-
rality, desire and human nature are all understood as historically changing 
and changeable. Such historicism is most manifest in Hegel’s philosophy of 
reason’s actualization but when MacIntyre wrote it was already beginning 
to inform anti–Stalinist Marxisms, and it can be traced back to the two es-
says by Kant with which we began. Along with theology, history became a 
ground for Kant’s “hope” that what one can “know” might, in some future, 
combine with what one “should ... do (Kant 1998, 677 (A805/B833); Kant’s 
emphases).
MacIntyre was to maintain his own historicism up to and beyond A Short 
History of Ethics. What he could not maintain in that book were his own his-
toricist hopes. Previously, he had followed Marx in hoping that the working 
class would act as an agent of progress. Perhaps his greatest difference from 
Hegel has always been his refusal to place his hopes in the modern state, 
and a difference from Kant has always been that he refuses to present the 
Rechsstaat as even a necessary condition of progress. Unlike Kant, Hegel and 
Marx, he, in A Short History, rejected any teleology of human history, argu-
ing that there is a plurality of conceptions of human nature between which 
(following Kierkegaard and Sartre) we have simply to “choose”. As he went 
on to argue, in differing also from neo–Kantianism, there can be no hope 
that even history might provide bases for a single science of humanity, since 
what we are told by the history of science (and especially of physics, which 
Kant and Kantians have regarded as the paradigmatic science) is that there 
is a radical plurality of rival scientific paradigms.
Famously, MacIntyre came to acknowledge the epistemological and his-
torical significance of rival scientific paradigms by 1977, the year in which he 
“began to write the final draft of After Virtue” (MacIntyre 1998b, 268). What 
has often been missed in his most famous publication of that year, “Episte-
mological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science”, is his 
endorsement of Kant’s conception of scientific and “philosophical progress” 
in enquiry: “Kant is essentially right; the notion of an underlying order — 
the kind of order that we would expect if the ingenious, unmalicious god 
of Newton and Einstein had created the universe — is a regulative ideal of 
physics” (MacIntyre 2006a, 22).
In another 1977 essay, MacIntyre placed his new idea of dramatic narra-
tive within an argument “that Kant’s moral philosophy does have more of a 
teleological framework than is usually recognized, and ... that his teleology 
is less distorting to moral experience than Aristotle’s” (MacIntyre 1977, 38). 
For Kant, teleology differs from the laws of physics in being only a non–
constitutive, regulative ideal. His teleological framework becomes apparent 
when one turns from the Groundwork “to the Kant of the second Critique and 
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Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone” (MacIntyre 1977, 31).3 Here, his 
approach to moral experience becomes intelligible because his conception 
of the human good “consists not merely of moral perfection, but of moral 
perfection crowned with happiness”, and because “Kant’s conception of 
moral progress is inseparable from his conception of the radical evil in hu-
man nature”, since “without radical evil there would be no progress, no 
journey, for there would be nothing to overcome” (MacIntyre 1977, 32, 34).4 
In those texts, “but also and especially in [Kant’s] writings on history, is a 
crucial metaphor, that of the life of the individual and also of that of the 
human race as a journey toward a goal”. Since this goal may be infinitely re-
mote, “human life is a quest”. What MacIntyre now finds “underlying Kant’s 
account of morality” is the “key concept ... of a moral progress” (MacIntyre 
1977, 32–4).5 
This concept of moral progress MacIntyre proposed to radicalize and 
pluralize, inviting us to “consider the following possibility: that a crucial 
part of moral progress consists in learning how to transform our notion of 
moral progress, that the meaning of a particular life does not lie in attaining 
any particular state of affairs but in the agent’s having traversed a course 
which is part of a larger moral history”. It is “such histories [that] present 
human life as [an] enacted dramatic narrative”. Whereas he had previously 
posed morality as a matter of choice, he now invites us to enquire “of what 
histories am I a part?”, adding that anyone “who knows himself to be part of 
a moral history whose outcome is as yet unsettled may be less likely to claim 
prematurely that title of universal moral legislator that Kant bestowed on 
all rational agents” in the Groundwork. Whilst “Kant makes the significance 
of history depend on the moral progress of individuals”, he proposes the 
reverse — that “the individual only has his moral identity as part of a larger 
history” (MacIntyre 1977, 39–41). He ends by appealing for “new initiatives 
in general moral and political theory and in the philosophy of history” (Mac-
Intyre 1977, 43).
MacIntyre now identified Kant’s moral philosophy as “a peculiarly sig-
nificant” episode in ”a larger moral history”. The Kantian episode followed 
the fragmentation “of the classical or theistic view of the world”, forming 
3 Earlier, MacIntyre had explored Karl Barth’s antinomianism as an alternative to Kant’s 
thoroughly rationalistic theology. Later, he presents Søren Kierkegaard’s anticipation of 
Barth as the theological consequence of Kant.
4 MacIntyre’s historical example of radical evil was Nazism, in which he seems to implicate 
not only “German Lutheranism” but even “strict Catholic families” (MacIntyre 1977, 37–8) 
— but no longer Kant. Much more recently, he has appeared to backdate Kant’s exonera-
tion in saying that “the most compelling justification for going to war against the Nazis had 
derived from what seemed to be Kantian principles, according to which there are certain 
ways in which no one should ever be treated” (MacIntyre 2009, 115–6).
5 Kant’s writings on history had been collected together in Beck 1963. 
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part of the narrative of an individualist “development of thought ... from ra-
tionalists and empiricists through Kant to neoKantianism and empiricism”. 
To this narrative MacIntyre juxtaposed “the development of a quite different 
type of reaction” to the fragmentation of the classical and theistic view in a 
tradition founded by Vico and finding “later representatives in thinkers as 
different as Herder and Hegel”, which is based in an anti–individualist phi-
losophy of history (MacIntyre 1977, 41–2).
2 In After Virtue
MacIntyre’s verdict on Kant in 1977 was that “Kant’s thesis that moral obli-
gation necessarily presupposes teleology turns out to be correct; his thesis 
that teleology necessarily presupposes theology turns out to be incorrect” 
(MacIntyre 1977, 41).6 This verdict is what was to separate the argument of 
After Virtue both from Kant and from the preceding critique of modern moral 
philosophy by Elizabeth Anscombe, with which it has often been compared. 
What also separates he argument from Kant is MacIntyre’s refusal of Kant’s 
separation of a psychological and sociological “anthropology” from what 
MacIntyre has always regarded as the psychologically unintelligible impera-
tives of an implausibly “pure” practical reason (to which he had now long 
added that familiar criticism of the emptiness of the Groundwork’s criterion 
of a maxim’s universalization which is standardly attributed to Hegel, and 
which he illustrated with examples, analytic–style, of the criterion’s elas-
ticity). By the time he finally drafted After Virtue, however, MacIntyre had 
come to understand Kant as doing much more than opposing to Hume’s 
moral anthropology an entirely unempirical moral ideal. Indeed, he goes so 
far as to invoke Kant in arguing that “a moral philosophy ... characteristi-
cally presupposes a sociology”, and “that we have not yet fully understood 
the claims of any moral philosophy until we have spelled out what its social 
embodiment would be”. The embodiment of Kant’s moral philosophy would 
be a society in which “each treats the other as an end”, offering them “good 
reasons for acting in one way rather than another, but ... leav[ing] it to them 
to evaluate those reasons”, so that “each rational agent must be his or her 
own judge”. Significantly, despite contending that “it would generally be a 
decisive refutation of a moral philosophy to show that moral agency on its 
own account of the matter could never be socially embodied”, MacIntyre 
6 MacIntyre was to admit that “at the time I wrote After Virtue I felt that I knew no way of 
fitting the theological part of the history ... into the overall account without losing the 
coherence of my narrative”, and that “the philosopher whose deepest and highly relevant 
preoccupations thereby received quite unduly short shrift was of course Kant” (MacIntyre 
1983, 448).
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immediately moves to his famous critique of an emotivist modernity. Had 
he dwelt a little longer on spelling out the social implications of Kantianism 
he would, since he points to Kant’s “writings on law, history and politics”, 
presumably have added that, even in such a kingdom of ends, individuals’ 
universalizable right to external freedom would be coercively enforced by a 
constitutional state. Instead, he describes contemporary society as the em-
bodiment of emotivism, in which “others are always means, never ends” and 
where there is no “genuine distinction between manipulative and non–ma-
nipulative social relations” (MacIntyre 2007, 23–4; cf. 46). This is a reality 
described by Kant’s German successors, in Marx’s explanation of capitalist 
exploitation, Weber’s account of bureaucratic management (and, we might 
add, Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason), and Ni-
etzsche’s portrayal of the human condition.
MacIntyre’s own account of the human condition is one in which the 
place accorded by Kant to the will is taken by desire. Although he credits 
Kant with both a teleology and a sociology, he never concedes to Kant a 
plausible philosophical psychology. Nietzsche was superior to the Enlight-
enment’s “most intellectually powerful protagonist” (MacIntyre 2007, 117) 
because he refused Kant’s separation of will from desire, replacing Kant’s 
egalitarian idea of autonomy with an altogether more elitist individualism of 
self–determination. MacIntyre’s new historicist hope is that Aristotle’s phil-
osophical psychology may yet prove superior to that of Nietzsche because 
of the way in which desire can be understood as subject to a non–Kantian, 
fully anthropological, sociological and teleological kind of practical reason-
ing. Therefore, where Kant drew a foundational distinction between what 
is, what ought to be done, and what might be hoped, MacIntyre draws them 
together in his “threefold structure of untutored human–nature–as–it–hap-
pens–to–be, human–nature–as–it–could–be–if–it–realized–its–telos and the 
precepts of rational ethics as the means for the transition from one to the 
other” (MacIntyre 2007, 53). The task of Aristotelian ethics is to establish, 
against Hume, Kant and Nietzsche, that desire can and should be educated, 
socially, in identifying and pursuing common goods.
Society, After Virtue proposes, is the first place in which to search for a 
contemporary argument for teleology. Even now, when its author has since 
recanted the book’s express dismissal of metaphysical biology, the natural-
ism he expounds remains, crucially, that of irreducibly social animals. In 
this, even if not in his emphasis on our animal embodiedness, he may be un-
derstood as retaking some of the steps taken by the neo–Kantianism rejected 
by Nietzsche (but not entirely by Weber) and Heidegger. Neo–Kantians elid-
ed the moral philosophy and moral anthropology that Kant had separated, 
in their attempt to make a distinctive kind of science out of morality and 
society, humanity and its history. Their attempt failed. In learning from that 
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failure, MacIntyre, instead of going back either to Kant or to themselves, 
returned to Aristotle — albeit to a historically contextualized Aristotle, and 
to an Aristotelianism in which politics is combined not only with ethics but 
also with sociology.7
MacIntyre’s is a sociology of particular practices, existing within and 
across particular communities, and of organizational institutions that differ 
from practices in being directed not teleologically, to their own specific and 
“internal” goods, but to such generic and “external” goods as wealth, power 
and status. The state is only the most powerful of such institutions. He ex-
plains Kant’s theoretical resort to universalizable, categorical imperatives as 
the consequence of trying “to understand the virtues outside the context of 
practices”. Goods internal to practices are “the excellences specific to those 
... practices which one achieves or fails to achieve” through one’s participa-
tion in those practices; “excellences our conception of which changes over 
time as our goals are transformed” by that participation. Such participation 
educates us into reasons for action that are “neither imperatives of skill nor 
imperatives of prudence, defined as [Kant] defined them”, and are not cat-
egorical or unconditional, since they are learned through participative expe-
rience (MacIntyre 2007, 273–4).
After Virtue accuses Kant of having “reject[ed] any teleological view of 
human nature, any view of man as having an essence which defines his true 
end”, even whilst crediting Kant with having recognized “that without a tel-
eological framework the whole project of morality becomes unintelligible” 
and, therefore, with having presented “as a ‘presupposition of pure practical 
reason’” a “teleological scheme of God, freedom and happiness as the final 
crown of virtue”. Therefore, he acknowledges, “if my thesis is correct, Kant 
was right” (MacIntyre 2007, 56); if his thesis that moral motivation requires 
some teleological framework as justification is correct,8 then Kant was right 
to try to reconstruct such a framework. Nonetheless, as we have seen, he 
had already argued that Kant’s own “thesis that teleology necessarily pre-
supposes theology” is incorrect, even whilst acknowledging also that there 
is in Kant’s “writings on history ... a crucial metaphor, that of the life of the 
individual and also of that of the human race as a journey toward a goal” or 
“a quest”, expressed in the “key concept ... of a moral progress”. This meta-
phor resembles the second element in the framework that MacIntyre himself 
7 MacIntyre has recently rebutted the arguments of Emile Perreau–Saussine, Pierre Manent, 
Sandra Laugier and Vincent Descombes that he subordinates Aristotelian politics to mod-
ern sociology (MacIntyre 2013, 203–6).
8 From what he has since written of “the ethical demand”, and perhaps also of “just generos-
ity”, it might seem that MacIntyre has since retreated from this central thesis of After Vir-
tue. Insofar as this may be true, he has nonetheless continued to refuse that moral precepts 
might be adequately justified as categorical imperatives.
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proposed in After Virtue; that of the narrative unity of a well–ordered life, 
aiming at happiness as its final crown. Yet even if MacIntyre concurs with 
Kant in this, After Virtue’s framework differs in beginning with practices and 
concluding with rival traditions of moral enquiry.
MacIntyre’s thesis in After Virtue is that the intelligibility of moral pre-
cepts necessarily presupposes teleology, and that a plausible moral teleology 
is now based in the sociology of those practices into which we are socialized 
as plain persons. It is in this way that he grounds his moral theory of practi-
cal reason, sociologically, psychologically and anthropologically. So ground-
ed, he argues, morality and teleology escape the Nietzschean critique that he 
perceives to have deconstructed the Enlightenment project and occasioned 
the death of modernity’s previous truths. So grounded, he escapes the pessi-
mistic dialectic of Adorno and Horkheimer with its “murky intertwinement 
of property, ownership, control, and management” (Horkheimer & Adorno 
2002, 172). What might remain insufficiently clear is his critique of Kant, 
given his haste in moving to his critique of emotivism from his proposition 
that a moral philosophy would be decisively refuted by demonstrating the 
impossibility of its social embodiment. 
3 Since After Virtue
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is “the successor volume” that MacIntyre 
promised in After Virtue (MacIntyre 2007, 278, 260). The latter “ought to be 
read as a work in progress”, not least because he cut its narrative short of 
“Kant’s ... rejection of Aristotelianism” (MacIntyre 2007, 278). What Mac-
Intyre apparently intended for its successor was “an historicist defence of 
Aristotle” that still enlisted “both Vico and Hegel” in opposition to any “re-
suscitation of the Kantian transcendental project” (MacIntyre 2007, 277).
Whilst such transcendentalism may well be considered the greatest tar-
get of the successor volume’s argument about rival traditions of enquiry, 
Kant turned out not at all to be that volume’s focus. As MacIntyre explained, 
had it also done “for Kant” and for “the whole Prussian tradition” what it 
instead did only for Hume and “the Scottish tradition”, it “would have be-
come impossibly long” (MacIntyre 1988, 11). What, in an aside, the volume 
did do for that “Prussian tradition” was extend it into a “Hegel–Green–Put-
nam view” in which phenomena are connected within a conceptual scheme 
(MacIntyre 1988, 169) to which epistemic standards are understood to be 
internal, which MacIntyre judges to be no adequate alternative to Kant’s 
transcendental idealism. 
Despite the Scottish context of what is often described as the third vol-
ume in a trilogy, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry is more concerned 
with the legacy of Kant than of Hume. One occasion for this concern is the 
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reappearance of Nietzsche, and another the participation in “encyclopae-
dia” of such Kantians as Caird, but the main reason is the influence of Kant 
upon the revival of Thomistic tradition. This revival coincided with that of 
Kantianism, and such Thomists as Rosmini and Maréchal borrowed from 
Kant in attempting to make Thomism relevant to contemporary philosophi-
cal issues. Against this temptation to try to synthesize antithetical traditions, 
MacIntyre insists on the historical uniqueness of Aquinas’ achievement. In 
this resistance to post–Aquinas syncretism we might detect some of the sig-
nificance of what MacIntyre now says (and perhaps also of what he does not 
say) of Kant, Kantianism and contemporary Kantians.
What might well remain the nearest that MacIntyre comes to his long–
deferred settling of scores with Kantianism is to be found in a later book, 
Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913–1922. Indeed, it may be fair to 
assume that such a settling of scores with both Kant and neo–Kantians was a 
guiding aim in this book. In its fourth chapter he recounts “The Background 
History” to the phenomenology of Husserl, Reinach and Stein. Running 
“From Hume to the neo–Kantians”, this history is intended to affirm Hus-
serl’s claim “that Kant’s response to Hume rested on a mistake” (MacIntyre 
2005, 37).
The very name “phenomenology” might well seem to return philoso-
phy to times prior to Kant’s neologism “noumena”, and all the way back 
to Aristotle (whence it was taken by Husserl’s teacher, Brentano, and by 
Heidegger), even if Husserl himself was content to go back only so far as 
Descartes. Nonetheless, in Edith Stein, uncharacteristically, MacIntyre dis-
regards all such earlier history. In taking Stein as his focus (and perhaps also 
in looking to Reinach, phenomenology’s precocious theorist of law), he indi-
cates that it might be possible to reinterpret “phenomenology in Thomistic 
terms” (MacIntyre 2005, 178). However, he also indicates how phenomenol-
ogy can be used, in its own terms, to explore such issues as embodiedness 
and colour–perception with which he had been trying to deal, in other terms, 
since Three Rival Versions. Husserl helps by enabling “us to identify what 
is prelinguistic in our experience” (MacIntyre 2005, 22). Husserl does not, 
like Kant, point us inwards to the will or the spontaneity of reason. Rather, 
he points us to intentional objects, including those objects of desire that Ar-
istotelians call goods. He, and Stein, “sketched a philosophical psychology 
whose starting–point ... is the experienced contents and objects of a single 
consciousness, of an ‘I’ reflecting upon and reporting what is presented to 
it” (MacIntyre 2005, 116).
Historically, Husserl helped by directing his followers “‘To the things 
themselves!’” (MacIntyre 2005, 22). As MacIntyre hints, this imperative was 
opposed to the original slogan of neo–Kantianism: “Back to Kant!”. In ex-
press opposition to that movement, phenomenology posed — as MacIntyre 
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puts it in the subtitle of his third chapter — “A New Starting–Point in Phi-
losophy”. This new starting–point helps MacIntyre to settle scores with that 
entire tradition of Prussian and German philosophy — Kantian, idealist, He-
gelian, and neo–Kantian — which had attempted to deal with the problems 
posed by empiricism and modern science for philosophy, by asserting the 
priority of reason to our understanding of our experience of nature. He had 
long been concerned with that tradition, and with Kant’s purported solu-
tion in terms of distinct “laws” of nature and of freedom. In 1977 he had 
hoped to tackle the problem in historicist terms, not entirely dissimilar to 
those of Wilhelm Dilthey and of the Baden School of Neo–Kantianism, by 
historicizing science and by looking to the philosophy of history for some 
broad answer. He restated this hope in After Virtue’s 1984 postscript, and 
the book had indeed recounted a “single history” of both “the self and its 
roles” and such moral concepts as managerial expertise, utility, and rights 
“through which the roles are given expression” (MacIntyre 2007, 35). This, 
coupled with his sociology of practices, allowed him to withdraw Aristote-
lianism from any express involvement in metaphysical biology. Since then, 
however, he has been concerned to retake much of the philosophical ground 
abandoned in that retreat. Now, phenomenology warrants the claim that the 
retreat was unnecessary, since what Kant had done in separating moral theo-
ry from both empirical and metaphysical anthropology was offer “a solution 
to a nonexistent problem” (MacIntyre 2005, 40).
On MacIntyre’s account, the new starting–point afforded by phenom-
enology vindicates the perceptual “judgments of plain prephilosophical per-
sons” (MacIntyre 2005, 52). Therefore, he indicates not that contemporary 
Thomistic Aristotelians should attempt to emulate Aquinas’ achievement 
by synthesizing Aristotelianism with phenomenology but, rather, that they 
should use phenomenological critique to establish how unnecessary are the 
epistemological contortions of rival contemporary philosophies, and that, 
whilst learning particular lessons from Husserl, Reinach and Stein, they 
should understand the broader function of phenomenology (as perhaps of 
Wittgenstein, for the analytic tradition) within the history of philosophy to 
be that of having overcome a problem that was contingent and unnecessary, 
because purely theoretical and not at all — except in Kant’s erroneously 
asocial sense — practical. 
Practically, Kant’s moral philosophy is, nonetheless, confronted by a real 
and necessary problem. This is the problem indicated in After Virtue’s prop-
osition that a moral philosophy would be refuted by establishing its social 
impossibility, and by its “critical” and historical argument that Aufklärung 
philosophy had turned out to be institutionalized not in any kingdom of ends 
but in the altogether darker reality described by Nietzsche and expressed by 
emotivists. It is a problem to which he has returned in “Some Enlightenment 
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Projects Reconsidered” (first published in 1995), and in some more recent 
essays. In the former, MacIntyre enumerates three Enlightenment projects 
in practical philosophy. The “first”, which “is presupposed by the other[s]”, 
is that of distinguishing “between the unenlightened and the enlightened, 
unenlightened them and enlightened us. Here the canonical text was and 
is Kant’s .... ‘What is Enlightenment?’”, and the Enlightenment’s defining 
“task” is that “of achieving a condition in which human beings think for 
themselves”. The second project was that specified in After Virtue, “of pro-
viding a single set of universal moral prescriptions, compelling to all ra-
tional individuals”, and the third “that of bringing into being and sustaining 
a set of social, economic and technological institutions designed to achieve 
the Enlightenment’s moral and political goals” (MacIntyre 2006b, 172–4). To 
these three projects he briefly adds a fourth, in which “the theorists of the 
European Enlightenment were brilliantly successful”: that of exposing “the 
groundlessness of [the] pretensions of the ruling and owning classes of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” and the arbitrariness of their power 
(MacIntyre 2006c, 172=4). As he has reiterated more recently, his charge is 
that contemporary institutions fail by the same criteria of rational justifica-
tion. 
MacIntyre insists that his “problem is with the practice of liberalism ... 
not with its ideals. It is with the extent to which the practice of liberalism 
is a betrayal of its ideals” by “political, financial, and media elites” and the 
institutions through which they rule (MacIntyre 2013, 202). One such ideal 
is that which Kant called external and, more specifically “negative” freedom, 
which MacIntyre happily acknowledges is necessary for such practices as 
those of the arts and sciences (MacIntyre 2011, 326–7). That which might be 
regarded as Kant’s teleological and historical ideal is the kingdom of ends. 
As MacIntyre once noted, even Marx sometimes wrote “as though commu-
nism will be an embodiment of the Kantian kingdom of ends” (MacIntyre 
1967, 214), and he has since followed Christine Korsgaard in again acknowl-
edging the idea (MacIntyre 2006d, 129). His argument has been that, under 
capitalist and managerial modernity, the treatment of people as means, not 
ends, is institutionalized and legitimated, notwithstanding liberal bluster 
about freedom, equality and rights. Liberal theory is therefore ideological, 
subtly justifying rule by competing elites in the state, as it does in the econo-
my, and thereby legitimating “the large inequality of access to and influence 
upon political decision–makers ... rooted in gross inequalities of money and 
economic power” (MacIntyre 2008, 263).
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4 Kant Recidivus
Recently, many leading Aristotelian and Kantian philosophers — and es-
pecially ethicists — have attempted to combine the arguments of Aristotle 
with those of Kant. Such contemporary Aristotelians–cum–Kantians include 
Korsgaard, Otfried Höffe, Nancy Sherman, and even Allen Wood, amongst 
many others. Perhaps the greatest of all attempts is that by T.H. Irwin, which 
has now assumed the monumental form of a three–volume history of The 
Development of Ethics, tracing western moral philosophy from the Socratic 
age to Rawls. Whereas attempts to join Kantian with Aristotelian ethics usu-
ally involve either a disregard or a dismissal of that which separates the 
two. Irwin’s approach is less hasty, in that he accepts that the transcenden-
tal idealism famously rejected in Peter Strawson’s adaption of Kant for ana-
lytic philosophy is an important part of the Kantian scheme. In nonetheless 
himself also rejecting that transcendentalism as incompatible with what he 
regards as essential to Kantian ethics, he signifies that what he is attempt-
ing is less a synthesis than an apprehension and adaption of Kant for Aris-
totelianism. His attempt is especially notable because the Aristotelianism 
that he attempts to combine with Kantianism is of a distinctly Thomistic 
kind (with no less than nine of its ninety–six chapters devoted to Aquinas). 
Nonetheless, MacIntyre has not elaborated in print on his suspicion, which 
expressed long ago but which he presumably continues to hold, that his 
own Aristotelianism is “at variance with Irwin’s” (MacIntyre 1998c, 187); 
a suspicion attributable, at least in part, to Irwin’s early attempt to identify 
foundational principles for Aristotelianism in a way that might be thought 
redolent of earlier attempts to construct an ahistorical Thomism. 
Irwin’s apprehension of Kant is now as historical as it is analytic. In his 
concern for the historicity of ethics, his Aristotelianism shares something 
important with MacIntyre. One important way in which their historicisms 
differ is that Irwin’s is an overwhelmingly intellectual and theoretical his-
tory, in which the intellectuals with whom he is concerned are as decontex-
tualized from their differing institutional and practical contexts as are those 
conjured up out of the past by Straussians. Another difference is that the 
intellectual history which Irwin recounts is that of a unitary progress. It is a 
progress from Aristotelian foundations, in which Aristotelian arguments are 
strengthened most notably by Aquinas, but thereafter also by more selective 
appropriations from Enlightenment philosophers, especially Kant, and also 
from such Kantian idealists as Green and such analytic Kantians as Rawls. 
Whilst Aristotelians might be tempted by such a surprising historical trium-
phalism, they might perhaps also wonder whether what appears to be their 
appropriation of Kant might not instead turn out to be their appropriation 
by Kantianism. 
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Kant can, of course, be understood in numerous different ways. Perhaps 
the most important interpretive difference is presently that between the 
transcendentalist Kant championed by Henry E. Allison and the altogether 
more historicist and teleological Kant being popularized by Paul Guyer.9 If 
both Irwin and MacIntyre are right, Allison’s Kant cannot become Aristote-
lian. What, though, of Guyer’s Kant?
As though echoing what MacIntyre said of Kant’s “teleological scheme 
of God, freedom and happiness”, Guyer calls “freedom, immortality, and 
God the presuppositions of morality” in his own account (Guyer 2014a, 242) 
of what MacIntyre had called “the Kant of the second Critique and Religion 
Within the Bounds of Reason Alone”. What Guyer adds is that the concept 
of progress is written into what might be understood as the architectonic 
conclusion of Kant’s critical philosophy, in Kant’s account of our reflective 
power of teleological judgment, and that what may be judged the teleological 
progress of humankind is institutionalized by the modern state. Guyer’s Kant 
thus seems like a cosmopolitan and rather untheological Hegel. “Kant’s moral 
philosophy, his aesthetics, and his teleology have all culminated in the claim 
that we must be able to conceive of our moral goals .... as being realizable in 
the history of the human species as a whole, rather than in the natural life or 
supernatural afterlife of individual human beings” (Guyer 2014a, 416).
Guyer’s post–Cold War Kant is a more coherent and unapologetic fig-
ure than the Kant to whom contemporaries of Marx, Nietzsche and Weber 
had returned. He might also be thought of as a more philosophically ambi-
tious complement to the practical Kants previously proposed by Rawls and 
Habermas. Within the academy, he seems now to be outpacing Nietzsche 
through the work of such scholars as Angela Breitenbach, Alix Cohen, Paul-
ine Kleingeld and Lea Ypi, amongst very many others. Notwithstanding cap-
italist crises and Islamist resistance, Kant’s Enlightenment ideals have been 
resurgent since After Virtue. 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre noted that Kant, “as much as ... Hume, discerns 
no essential natures and no teleological features in the objective universe 
available for study by physics”. This is surely right. From this he inferred 
that Kant, like other Enlightenment moralists, rejected “any teleological view 
of human nature, any view of man as having an essence which defines his 
true end” (MacIntyre, 2007, 54; emphases added).10 From the perspective of 
Guyer’s Kant, this inference is too quick. Precisely because Kant had a con-
ception of human history, and also because he had a metaphysically biologi-
cal conception of the human species, resurgent Kantianism can now reassert 
9 See especially Allison 2004 and Guyer 2014.
10 For an appreciation of “underlying unresolved tensions” between Kant’s conceptions of 
ethics and of teleology, see MacIntyre 2006b 142.
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a conception of the progressive and increasingly purposive actualization of 
individual freedom that had been lost to philosophy by the late 1940s, follow-
ing fascist reaction, Communist conquest, and two world wars. For sure, such 
liberal reassertion is less brash now than it was for decades up until a century 
ago, at the height of Western imperialism. Nonetheless, it is unmistakable.
Resurgent Kantianism contrasts with the Kantianism of both the 1900s 
and 1940s in deemphasizing moral duties and newly emphasizing legal rights. 
The contemporary Kant is, most importantly, a proponent of the singular right 
to freedom, as choice. Indeed, this “Kant’s conception of freedom [is] as the 
fundamental principle and object of morality” (Guyer 2000, 11; emphasis add-
ed). The practical philosophy of this new Kant is a theory of justice, and a the-
ory of justice that provides not only an adequate moral groundwork but also, 
contra Rawls, an adequate grounding in politics (Guyer 2000, 235–86; Guyer 
2014b). His moral imperative remains that of obedience to rules, but the rules 
that one is enjoined to obey are the impersonal laws made and imposed by 
the constitutional state. The pluralism of rival traditions is accommodated by 
prioritizing The Metaphysics of Morals over the Groundwork and by prioritiz-
ing the latter’s “Doctrine of Right” over its “Doctrine of Virtue”, in a way which 
renders fully Kantian supplementation of the second Critique’s “fact of rea-
son” with a new “fact of reasonable pluralism”, so that choice between moral 
and religious doctrines does not endanger public reasoning about stability 
or justice.11 Here, Guyer’s Kant is joined by the Kants of, for example, Katrin 
Flikschuh, Wolfgang Kersting, Reidar Maliks, Thomas Pogge, Arthur Ripstein 
and the Aristotelian–cum–Kantian Otfried Höffe. Since moral individualism 
is here overtaken by, even though continuous with, political institutionalism, 
this Kant finds a close ally in the Hegel revived by the likes of Axel Honneth, 
Kimberly Hutchings, Frederick Neuhouser and Robert Pippin. For none of 
these thinkers is the ideal and goal of equal individual freedom under states’ 
law guaranteed, any more than is human perfection guaranteed in Aristotle’s 
teleology. As Guyer says in concluding his most popular presentation of Kant, 
“nature, through history, can only offer means for us to use for the realization 
of justice and beyond that virtue and the highest good, and indeed we must 
be able to conceive of it as offering us such means. But it remains up to us to 
choose to use them freely and thereby realize our autonomy in all of its di-
mensions” (Guyer 2014a, 429–30).
If Kant once provided “a rational voice for the emerging social forces of 
liberal individualism” (MacIntyre 2007, 268), he seems now to be providing 
the most eloquent philosophical voice for that individualism’s institution-
11 Cf. Rawls 2000, 253–72 (and, for Rawls’ account of “the moral psychology of the Religion”, 
in addition to his lengthy, Patonian treatment of the Groundwork, 2000, 291–328), and 
Rawls 2005, 440–5.
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al universalization and globalization. Even if his transcendental idealism 
failed, his individualist ideal of a kingdom of ends actualized historically 
through the progressive and intentional institutionalization of law seems, 
after all, to have survived Nietzschean critique. “Finality no longer has a 
theological principle, but rather, theology has a ‘final’ human foundation”, 
in which “the final relationship between Nature and man is the result of a 
human practical activity” (Deleuze 1984, 69; emphases omitted). Indeed, 
contemporary Kantianism’s untheological,12 religiously neutral and politi-
cally activist conception of a liberal telos of history, in which virtue and the 
highest good are identified with recognition of the rights of Nietzsche’s last 
man, appears to be gaining in force and appeal, theoretically, institution-
ally and practically, as even non–western individuals identify themselves as 
participants within a dramatic liberal narrative of progress toward freedom 
— even if its real enactors remain states, their personnel, and lawyers, in 
what might be characterized as an institutionalized will to power. As Kant 
predicted, military conflict and capitalist commerce seem to have caused 
politicians and states to actualize individuals’ external freedom — even if 
not at all, in the long run, their material equality. Therefore, if Aristotelians 
are persuaded by MacIntyre to resist attempts to synthesize Kant and Aris-
totle, it is imperative that they try to determine how best to answer a new 
question: Kant or Aristotle?
To discern how MacIntyre might answer this, on behalf of Aristotle, we 
may return to his “Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered”. There, he 
identified as one of the Enlightenment’s projects that of creating and sus-
taining institutions to achieve its moral and political goals, identifying as the 
Enlightenment’s primary goal Kantian autonomy or “thinking for oneself” 
(MacIntyre 2006c, 174). Understood in terms other than those of Kantian 
“spontaneity” or self–legislation, as independent practical reasoning, this is 
an ideal that MacIntyre shares. He acknowledges that it has “been a central 
belief of the Enlightenment’s modern heirs that such institutions have by 
now been brought into being in so–called advanced countries and that they 
do, substantially even if imperfectly, embody the Enlightenment’s aspira-
tions, so that those actual institutions ... have a claim to the allegiance of 
rational individuals”. Amongst such institutions are those of “a legal system 
12 Guyer argues that Kant held “that both our virtue and our happiness must be perfected 
within nature, not someplace else”, even whilst making the mighty concession that “that 
it would be welcome if we could find a way to retain Kant’s normative moral philosophy 
... without taking on all of the burden of his reconstruction of teleology as well as of his 
metaphysics of the will”, weighed down as the former is by his theology and the latter by 
his transcendental idealism (Guyer 2008, 253–4, emphases added). Guyer is influenced 
by a later literature (especially works by Lewis White Beck and Manfred Kuehn) than was 
MacIntyre in his understanding of Kant’s relation to Hume.
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purporting to safeguard the rights which individuals need, if they are to 
be treated as autonomous, including rights to freedom of expression and 
enquiry”, and those of “a free–market economy”. His charge is “that the con-
joint workings of these institutions systematically achieved and achieves 
very different outcomes from those expected by the Enlightenment, by in 
fact frustrating or undermining ... autonomy” (MacIntyre 2006c, 173). What 
is therefore required is a quest for institutions that can help people to ac-
tualize autonomy by learning from one another, as they do through par-
ticipation in practices purposively ordered to the actualization of common 
goods. This, MacIntyre argues against Kant and his successors, must be a 
search for institutions other than those of the state and its corporate crea-
tions. Against the anti–Kantian pessimisms of Nietzsche and of Horkheimer 
and Adorno MacIntyre perceives grounds for hope in institutions of Thom-
istic and Aristotelian enquiry, and in all of those practices that “cannot but 
remain central to human life” and through which “the importance of the vir-
tues is recurrently rediscovered” (MacIntyre 2013, 216–7). Unlike Nietzsche, 
unlike Kant, and unlike subsequent self–styled critical theorists — but, he 
insists, like Aristotle and Aristotelianism, rightly understood — MacIntyre 
considers it a task of philosophy “to enable plain persons to articulate the 
hitherto unrecognized presuppositions of their actions, so that they become 
able to criticize those presuppositions and to engage in critical and self criti-
cal deliberation with others” within their non–universal, always–particular 
practices and communities (MacIntyre 2013, 207).
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Abstract
 “IF MY THESIS IS CORRECT, KANT WAS RIGHT”: 
REVISITING KANT’S ROLE WITHIN MACINTYRE’S 
CRITIQUE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT
Although Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue is famous for its critique of the En-
lightenment project in moral theory, and although Immanuel Kant is usually 
considered the greatest protagonist of that project, Kant’s role within the argu-
ment of After Virtue is far less clear than one might presume. After exploring 
Kant’s role within MacIntyre’s work — before, within and since After Virtue — 
this paper will argue that the greatest alternative to Aristotle in contemporary 
philosophy, ethics and politics is no longer Nietzsche, as After Virtue proposed, 
but Kant. Kant’s representation by such contemporary Kantians as Paul Guyer is 
of a figure who presciently anticipated developments in philosophy and politics 
and has withstood deconstruction by Nietzscheans. Therefore, contemporary 
Aristotelians still need to find some way to come to terms with Kant’s version of 
the Enlightenment project and of liberalism — and, indeed, with liberal institu-
tions as justified in Kantian terms.
KEYWORDS: Aristotelianism, Guyer, institutions, Kant, Kantianism, MacIntyre, 
practices, progress, rights, teleology.
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